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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Canada is widely seen as an example of what can be 
accomplished by effective tobacco control efforts.1  The country’s 
numerous policy precedents have been replicated in many 
countries and have shaped international efforts on tobacco 
regulation, such as the World Health Organization’s Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control.2  The result of Canada’s policy 
interventions is a decline in cigarette smoking over the past quarter 
century that few countries have been able to match.3
       †   Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Ottawa; Special Lecturer, Division 
of Epidemiology and Public Health, University of Nottingham. 
 1. David Sweanor & Ken Kyle, Legislation and Applied Economics in the Pursuit 
of Public Health: Canada, in TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY: STRATEGIES, SUCCESSES AND 
SETBACKS 71 (Joy de Beyer & Linda Waverly Brigden eds., 2003). 
 2. See World Health Org. (WHO), Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at 
http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHO_FCTC_english.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2008). 
 3. See Donald W. Gardner & Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children from Joe 
Camel and His Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis of 
Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46 EMORY L.J. 479, 523–24 (1997); Jennifer Lesny, 
Tobacco Proves Addictive: The European Community’s Stalled Proposal to Ban Tobacco 
Advertising, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 149, 165 n.143 (1993); see also Health 
Canada, The National Strategy: Moving Forward—The 2006 Progress Report on Tobacco 
Control, Jan. 15. 2007, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/pubs/tobac-tabac/prtc-relct-
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The accomplishment is based, in part, on the fact that Canada 
started with such a horrendous problem.  In the early 1980s, when I 
first started working full time on tobacco control efforts, Canada 
had one of the most serious smoking problems in the world.  Per 
capita cigarette consumption was among the highest in the world, 
with over 40% of fifteen to nineteen-year olds reported to be daily 
smokers.4  There were no legislated restrictions on tobacco 
advertising, no legislated package warnings, and negligible 
protection from environmental tobacco smoke.5  Cigarette taxes 
were not only low, but had fallen in real terms for decades.6  This 
situation can be attributed in part to the fact that the tobacco 
manufacturers were powerful and extremely well connected 
politically.7  Also, Canada was a large producer of tobacco with a 
crop size that, on a per capita basis, was considerably larger than 
that of the United States at the time.8
Currently, Canada has tobacco taxes that are not only among 
the highest in the world,9 but are also expressly linked to the goal 
of reducing smoking.10  Tobacco advertising and promotion are 
essentially banned,11 retail displays are disappearing,12 graphic 
health warnings cover half the cigarette package,13 and additional 
health information is required as package inserts.14  Federal law 
mandates extensive constituent testing and requires disclosure of 
the results to the federal health department.15  All cigarettes must 
meet reduced ignition propensity standards.16  In addition, smoke-
free spaces for public (and many private) areas are mandated by 
law,17 and there are legislated—and enforced—restrictions 
regarding where and to whom cigarettes can be sold.18
2006/part2_e.html#1b (showing a greater than 60% decline in per capita 
consumption from the early 1980s to 2005). 
 4. Sweanor & Kyle, supra note 1, at 73 (citing Health Canada, Canadians 
Smoking: An Update, Cat. No. H39-214/1991E (1991)). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 74. 
 7. Id. at 73. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 87–90. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Tobacco Act, R.S.C., ch. 13, pt. IV(22) (1997). 
 12. Id. at pt. IV(29)–(30). 
 13. Id. at pt. III(15)(1); Sweanor & Kyle, supra note 1, at 84. 
 14. Tobacco Act, R.S.C., ch. 13, pt. III(15)(2). 
 15. Id. at pt. I(7). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Non-Smokers’ Health Act, R.S.C., ch. 15, pt.(3) (1985) (stating that 
2
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As a direct result of these policy interventions, per capita 
cigarette consumption in Canada is down by roughly 60% in the 
past quarter century.19  Canada entered the 1980s with a reported 
smoking prevalence of over 40%.20  By 2006, only 18% of Canadians 
fifteen years and older reported being smokers and only 14% 
reported being daily smokers.21  Perhaps even more impressive, 
reported daily smoking among fifteen to nineteen-year olds 
decreased from 42% at the beginning of the 1980s to only 9% in 
2006.22
In examining the way policy changes have so dramatically 
reduced cigarette consumption in Canada, there can be a tendency 
to think that Canada is somehow different from other countries 
and that tobacco control policies were somehow easier to achieve.  
But public policy is like a game of football.  Political changes do 
not happen spontaneously any more than a football moves up or 
down a field on its own.  Policy issues, like footballs, move based on 
the forces brought into play.  In Canada, the health side of policy 
was not actively engaged in the politics of tobacco until the early 
1980s.23  Once health policy became an issue, the country was 
radically transformed through a long series of campaigns, and 
virtually everything found on most standard lists of tobacco control 
strategies has now been implemented.24
This raises some interesting questions, not the least of which is 
why a lawyer who was a key player in so many of these regulatory 
battles, who built a career around fighting for such measures and 
convincing others that policy interventions were the most 
important measures available to counter the health toll of smoking, 
would now be asked to talk about “the limits to regulation.”  To be 
honest to our long term health objectives, however, it is extremely 
important to critically examine what has been accomplished 
nothing in the act requiring smoke-free environments affects any rights to 
protection from tobacco smoke under any Act of Parliament or provincial 
legislation). 
 18. See, e.g., Tobacco Act, R.S.C., ch. 13 (1997) (limiting how, where, and to 
whom cigarettes may be sold); Smoke-Free Ontario Act, R.S.O., ch. 10 (1994) 
(“No person shall sell or supply tobacco to a person who is less than 19 years 
old.”). 
 19. See Health Canada, supra note 3. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Sweanor & Kyle, supra note 1, at 74–81. 
 24. Id. at 74–95. 
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through policy interventions, to be open to the thought that some 
of our interventions have not achieved all of our goals, and to think 
about where tobacco control policy needs to head in the future. 
II. “CHECKED ALL THE BOXES” 
Canadian tobacco control advocates are perhaps in an ideal 
position to consider the limits of regulation because Canada is one 
of a growing number of countries that have implemented virtually 
all of the components of traditional comprehensive strategies to 
reduce smoking.25  The country has “checked all the boxes.”  
Despite all of the policy successes and the dramatic reductions in 
cigarette smoking over the past quarter century, however, there are 
still over 4.5 million Canadians who smoke,26 and smoking is still 
the country’s leading cause of preventable death.27  Further, many 
policies have reached either a limit on what can be done, or at least 
a state of greatly diminishing marginal returns. 
Tobacco control is not unlike efforts to contain other causes of 
disease where measures have been used that reduce the severity of 
a problem but still leave a large number of people who appear 
unresponsive to standard treatments.  The medical profession deals 
with such issues on an ongoing basis, and the role of skilled 
physicians is to consider the limits of standard treatments, prevent 
iatrogenic conditions, and look to new interventions that can lessen 
the remaining risks.  Public policy advocates dealing with tobacco-
caused disease should be just as vigilant. 
III. OBSTACLES TO TRADITIONAL REGULATION 
Simply doing “more of the same” is a seemingly attractive 
option when actions to date have worked remarkably well.  But, as 
with doctors who might be tempted to treat an antibiotic-resistant 
disease with more of the same antibiotics—after all, the treatment 
worked successfully with plenty of other people presenting with 
similar symptoms—it is important to consider the limits, as well as 
the successes of our interventions. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Health Canada, Canadian Tobacco Use Monitoring Survey, Dec. 12, 2007, 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/tobac-tabac/research-recherche/stat/_ctumsesutc_ 
2006/wave-phase-1_summary-sommaire_e.html. 
 27. Health Canada, Smoking and Your Body, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/tobac-tabac/body-corps/index_e.html. 
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A. Diminishing Returns 
The first broad category of limits to regulation in Canada is 
the decreasing marginal benefits of simply continuing to apply 
traditional tobacco control interventions.  An example of this can 
be seen in relation to tax policy.  Canada was able to dramatically 
increase the price of cigarettes, in part because the price had been 
so low.28  Tripling real prices has a tremendous dampening effect 
on consumption,29 but tripling prices again is nearly impossible.  
Among other issues facing Canada, there is now a significant 
contraband market.30  Although hard to estimate, it appears that 
cigarettes manufactured on, or shipped through, Indian Reserves 
could account for as much as 20% of current cigarette 
consumption in Canada’s two most populous provinces.31  The 
presence of these alternative, untaxed sources of supply clearly 
limit the pursuit of policies that are aimed at making tobacco 
products less available to smokers through further tax increases.  At 
the same time, measures aimed at requiring cigarettes to be made 
less palatable to smokers or otherwise trying to force smokers to 
quit via regulation32 become less viable in the face of this illicit 
supply.  In effect, tobacco control policy aimed at forcing 
 28. See Sweanor & Kyle, supra note 1, at 91 (figure showing that the retail 
price for 200 cigarettes in Canada was less than twenty Canadian dollars into the 
early 1980s). 
 29. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO 
EPIDEMIC, 2008: THE MPOWER PACKAGE 39 (2008), http://www.who.int/tobacco/ 
mpower/mpower_report_full_2008.pdf [hereinafter WHO REPORT] (“A 70% 
increase in the price of tobacco could prevent up to a quarter of all smoking-
related deaths worldwide.”). 
 30. GFK RESEARCH DYNAMICS, ILLICIT USAGE OF CIGARETTES—NATIONAL STUDY 
FOR THE C.T.M.C.—CANADIAN TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS COUNCIL 8 (2007) 
(showing that 22% of purchased cigarettes in 2007 in Canada were contraband, an 
increase from 16.5% in 2006). 
 31. In Ontario, 31.6% of cigarettes purchased were contraband.  Id. at 11. 
40.7% of contraband cigarettes were bought on Indian Reserves.  Id. at 26.  As a 
result, approximately 12.9% of all cigarettes purchased in Ontario were 
contraband bought on Indian Reserves.  In Quebec, 30.5% of purchased cigarettes 
were contraband.  Id. at 11.  20.6% of contraband cigarettes came from Indian 
Reserves.  Id. at 26.  Thus, about 6.3% of all cigarettes purchased in Quebec were 
contraband bought on Indian Reserves. 
 32. See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, TOBACCO-FREE PHARMACIES 
(2006), http://www.smoke-free.ca/pdf_1/pharmacy-backgrounder.pdf (advo-
cating banning sales of tobacco in pharmacies). 
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abstinence is running into some of the same constraints as past and 
present prohibitionist approaches to alcohol and other drugs.33
Further examples of diminishing returns from our policy 
interventions can be found in the realm of smoke-free policies.  
Making all workplaces and public areas smoke-free is expected to 
have a significant impact on both the number of smokers and the 
amount of cigarettes that are consumed.34  A tremendous number 
of smokers are impacted when workplaces and public areas go 
smoke-free, but once we move into the realm of “tidying up the 
leftovers”—such as trying to extend smoke-free policies into areas 
like shared residential buildings—we can expect less overall impact, 
simply because we are dealing with far smaller numbers of affected 
people.  There are certainly gains that can still be made through 
the application of more traditional approaches to tobacco control, 
but such gains pale in comparison to both the accomplishments of 
the past (the low hanging fruit is gone) and to the magnitude of 
the projected future health toll from smoking. 
B. Self-Imposed Limits 
The second broad category of limits on regulation is, 
paradoxically, effectively self-imposed by the culture of the tobacco 
control movement.  Canada has done much to reduce smoking 
onset, encourage cessation, and protect non-smokers.  Now, the 
country is running up against the limits of tobacco regulation 
caused by the attitude of the now-entrenched anti-tobacco 
community to regulation.35  Tobacco control advocates have, like 
other social groups, developed their own paradigms through which 
they see the world and possibilities for further interventions.36  As 
Thomas Kuhn’s work demonstrates so well, such paradigms dictate 
 33. See generally CRAIG HERON, BOOZE: A DISTILLED HISTORY 235–66 (2003) 
(discussing Canada’s experience with Prohibition in the 1920s). 
 34. See WHO REPORT, supra note 29, at 26 (“Smoke-free laws in workplaces 
can cut absolute smoking prevalence by 4%.  Smoke-free policies in workplaces in 
several industrialized nations have reduced total tobacco consumption among 
workers by an average of 29%.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada, About Us, 
http://www.smoke-free.ca/eng_home/pschome_about.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 
2008).  The organization has “one goal,” which is “the reduction of tobacco-caused 
illness through reduced smoking and exposure to second-hand smoke.”  Id. 
 36. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 24 (2d 
ed. 1970) (“[T]he paradigm forces scientists to investigate some part of nature in a 
detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable.”). 
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what is acceptable and can blind people to effective alternative 
courses of action.37  The result is that a critical limitation on further 
regulation is actually self-imposed by the views of tobacco control 
advocates.  This can either cause the pursuit of less effective health 
interventions or prevent the pursuit of strategies likely to yield 
greater gains.38
Further regulatory progress is, for example, constrained by 
lobbying for impractical goals based on an ideological view of 
appropriate interventions rather than a pragmatic public health 
orientation.  A group sharing an ideology often sees such schemes 
as deeply desirable, but these schemes stymie progress on policy 
interventions by redirecting energy and resources from practical 
goals to unattainable, ineffective, or even counter-productive 
strategies.  Examples of this, in the case of Canada, include 
pursuing the nationalization of the tobacco industry39 and pursuing 
restrictions on tobacco use that cannot be justified on the basis of 
protecting others, such as promoting prohibition of the use of any 
tobacco product anywhere on the grounds of hospital campuses.40
C. Existing Regulations Seen as an End Instead of a Means 
A further limitation on regulatory strategies is that, in some 
cases, existing regulatory measures, such as blanket advertising 
bans, graphic package warnings, or industry de-normalization, have 
come to be seen as an end in themselves rather than as a means of 
achieving improved public health.41  As such, efforts to re-think 
such measures are often rejected out-of-hand by anti-tobacco forces 
 37. See id. at 64 (“In the development of any science, the first received 
paradigm is usually felt to account quite successfully for most of the observations 
and experiments easily accessible to that science’s practitioners.”). 
 38. See id. (“[P]rofessionalization leads, on the one hand, to an immense 
restriction of the scientist’s vision and to a considerable resistance to paradigm 
change.”). 
 39. See CYNTHIA CALLARD ET AL., CURING THE ADDICTION TO PROFITS: A SUPPLY-
SIDE APPROACH TO PHASING OUT TOBACCO 14–15 (2005), http://www.policy 
alternatives.ca/documents/National_Office_Pubs/2005/curing_the_addiction_ 
summary.pdf. 
 40. Ottawa Hospital instituted a campus-wide smoke-free policy in June 2006.  
Ottawa Hospital, Designated Smoking Areas, http://www.ottawahospital.on.ca/ 
media/extras/smoke-zones-e.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).  However, the 
hospital changed the policy in November 2007 and now allows smoking in three 
designated outdoor areas.  Id.  Unintended consequences of the policy included 
effects on patient and employee safety, as well as on neighboring businesses.  Id. 
 41. See, e.g., WHO REPORT, supra note 29, at 36–38 (advocating “complete” 
and “comprehensive marketing bans” on tobacco companies). 
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as being “a step backwards.”  Yet, this is inconsistent with the 
pragmatic approaches and recognition of the differences between 
means and ends advocated by such social reformers as Saul 
Alinsky,42 and it can stymie further progress at attaining health 
goals.  For instance, a regulatory strategy could include advertising 
less toxic tobacco products to current smokers as an alternative to 
cigarettes, mandating smoker-friendly package messaging aimed 
directly at facilitating cessation, or differentiating between the 
culpability of different tobacco companies as a way of changing the 
behavior of the tobacco companies that are benefiting most from a 
status quo centered on cigarettes.  In the absence of a willingness to 
re-examine previously passed regulatory strategies, however, 
progress in such areas is impossible. 
This self-imposed constraint on acceptable action by some of 
those promoting a tobacco control agenda is perhaps most 
notable—and most damagingly counter-productive—when one 
examines the issue of harm reduction for nicotine users.  There is 
no scientific doubt that there is a vast continuum of risk depending 
upon how someone obtains nicotine.43  If all smokers obtained 
their nicotine from medicinal or low-toxicity non-combustion 
products, the health concerns about the drug would approach 
those associated with the contemporary use of caffeine.44  Yet many 
tobacco control advocates generally dismiss the idea of harm 
reduction in favor of an abstinence-only (or “quit-or-die”) 
orientation.45  The result is that these tobacco control advocates 
 42. See generally SAUL ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS (Vintage Books ed. 1989) 
(1972). 
 43. See, e.g., Neal Benowitz, The Safety and Toxicity of Nicotine; TOBACCO 
ADVISORY GROUP, ROYAL COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, HARM REDUCTION IN NICOTINE 
ADDICTION: HELPING PEOPLE WHO CAN’T QUIT 88–103, 119–29 (2007), available at 
http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/pubs/Listing.aspx (follow “Harm reduction in 
nicotine addiction” hyperlink) (discussing the variety of sources of nicotine and 
the use of nicotine replacement therapy); Kenneth E. Warner et al., The Emerging 
Market for Long-Tern Nicotine Maintenance, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1087 (1997) 
(discussing alternative nicotine-delivery products and a variety of regulatory 
approaches). 
 44. See BENNETT ALAN WEINBERG & BONNIE K. BEALER, THE WORLD OF CAFFEINE, 
303–15 (2001) (discussing how caffeine does cause physical dependence, and 
toxicity in high doses, but that caffeine use has been normalized).  Although 
physical dependence results, it has not been classified as a clinical dependence 
syndrome.  Id. at 303, 306–08. 
 45. See WHO REPORT, supra note 29, at 7 (“We must act now to reverse the 
global tobacco epidemic and save millions of lives.”).  The WHO estimates one 
billion deaths from the “tobacco epidemic” in the twenty-first century “unless 
urgent action is taken.”  Id. at 6. 
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often sound more like moralists seeking to save souls rather than 
health campaigners seeking to save lives.46  This is consistent with 
what has been experienced in numerous other public health 
campaigns throughout history47 and a critical question for future 
policy directions is just how quickly tobacco control efforts can 
evolve to become more pragmatic rather than dogmatic. 
Abstinence-only orientation, among other things, has greatly 
limited the ability to implement product standards that can reduce 
risks for continuing users of nicotine, thereby fulfilling the “fourth 
leg of public health interventions.”48  This orientation is also 
strongly at odds with past successful efforts to regulate goods and 
services which have been principally based on the recognition of 
differential risks and the resulting ability of regulation to reduce 
death, injury, and disease.49  The failure to accept harm reduction 
strategies as part of its regulatory armamentarium has also 
sacrificed the moral high ground on the issue of the human rights 
of smokers.  It has gone so far as to include gross 
 46. Id.  “The cure for this devastating epidemic is dependent not on 
medicines or vaccines, but on the concerted actions of government and civil 
society.”  Id. at 7. 
 47. See, e.g., ALLAN M. BRANDT, NO MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 (1st ed. 1985) (discussing 
efforts to curb venereal diseases in the United States since 1880); ESTHER KAPLAN, 
WITH GOD ON THEIR SIDE: HOW CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISTS TRAMPLED SCIENCE, 
POLICY, AND DEMOCRACY IN GEORGE W. BUSH’S WHITE HOUSE 194–218 (2004) 
(discussing the Bush administration’s effort to combat teen pregnancy and STDs 
through an abstinence-only message); JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING 
THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF 1906 (1989) (discussing the campaign to 
pass the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906); David Sweanor et al., Tobacco Harm 
Reduction: How Rational Public Policy Could Transform a Pandemic, 18 INT’L J. DRUG 
POL’Y 70 (2007) (discussing alternative systems of nicotine delivery and a harm-
reduction approach, as opposed to an abstinence-only approach). 
 48. See Sweanor et al., supra note 47, at 70 (delineating four broad categories 
of intervention aimed at “reducing the risk of death, injury or disease from any 
behaviour” as “efforts to prevent the behaviour ever taking place, efforts aimed at 
ending the behaviour, efforts aimed at preventing the activity from harming third 
parties, and efforts aimed at reducing the risks of those who engage in the 
behaviour”); see also David Sweanor, Legal Strategies to Reduce Tobacco-Caused Disease, 
8 RESPIROLOGY 413, 417 (2003) (discussing both legislative and litigation efforts to 
address tobacco use). 
 49. See e.g., SANDRA HEMPEL, THE STRANGE CASE OF THE BROAD STREET PUMP: 
JOHN SNOW AND THE MYSTERY OF CHOLERA (Univ. of Cal. Press 2007) (2006) 
(discussing John Snow’s effort to discover the cause behind an 1854 London 
cholera epidemic); YOUNG, supra note 47 (discussing the pre-cursors to the 
eventual regulation of food quality). 
9
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misrepresentations of relative risk in an apparent effort to adhere 
to an abstinence-only agenda.50
IV. WHICH WAY FORWARD? 
Canada stands as a good example of the limits of standard 
tobacco regulatory measures and, simultaneously, the limits 
imposed by the tobacco control community itself on what may be 
seen as acceptable regulatory measures.  Seeking a way forward via 
the next generation of tobacco control is of huge importance if 
Canada is to successfully reduce the projected toll of a million 
smoking-caused deaths in the country over the next quarter 
century.51  Canada is also at the leading edge of global tobacco 
control policy.52  The path Canada takes will be of enormous 
importance to the rest of the world because it is projected that a 
billion smoking-caused deaths will occur globally this century.53
 
 50. See, e.g., Can Tobacco Cure Smoking? A Review of Tobacco Harm Reduction: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 40 (2003) (statement of Richard 
Carmona, U.S. Surgeon General) (“Smokeless tobacco is not a safe alternative to 
cigarettes.”); Carl V. Philips et al., You Might as Well Smoke, BMC PUB. HEALTH 4, 
Apr. 5, 2005, http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-2458-5-31.pdf 
(identifying 108 websites claiming “risks from [smokeless tobacco] are as bad or 
worse than those from smoking”).  “[U]se of Western smokeless tobacco (ST) is 
substantially less harmful than smoking cigarettes.”  Id. at 1.  See also PHYSICIANS FOR 
A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, REFLECTIONS ON THE ‘SWEDISH EXPERIENCE’: IS SNUS UP TO 
SNUFF? (2003), http://www.smoke-free.ca/pdf_1/snus.pdf (discussing health 
effects of a Swedish smokeless tobacco product). 
 51. See PARVIS GHADIRIAN, SLEEPING WITH A KILLER: THE EFFECTS OF SMOKING ON 
HUMAN HEALTH 6–7 (2008), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-
vs/alt_formats/hecs-sesc/pdf/pubs/tobac-tabac/swk-dat/swk-dat_e.pdf.  About 
one in six smokers are projected to die by the 2020s–2030s, and there were 5.4 
million Canadian smokers in 2001.  Id. 
 52. See Sweanor & Kyle, supra note 1, at 71 (stating that the number of 
Canadian smokers declined from 1965–2001 from 50% of the population to 22%). 
 53. WHO REPORT, supra note 29, at 6. 
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